Brief of the Plaintiff for Recusal of Justice Michele Hollins

Update May 6, 2019: 

Watch for the next blog post which will review the latest of Justice Michele Hollins' rulings in this case with serious errors, this time for the applications for her recusal and costs, which will also be appealed. 

It is an understatement to say these rulings are a distortion of facts, an affront to binding appellate law, and confirmation of bias, which should offend every citizen who expects our judges to be fair and transparent. 

Some of the serious "errors" in Justice Hollins' rulings include:

• Justice Hollins failed to disclose the serious conflict of interest she is in which was made known when defence counsel Mr. Mack advised by letter dated December 1, 2017 that the defendant Gowlings legally represents the Canadian Bar Foundation (CBF) and the Canadian Bar Law for the Future Fund (LFF), and that Justice Hollins is identified as Director of these organizations at the same time she was assigned as case management judge. Justice Hollins failed to disclose this and other conflicts of interest on the record which is the judge's duty as articulated in the Court of Appeal decision in this same case, Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 ABCA 384. Evidence is in the plaintiff's April 16, 2019 affidavit. It is also not sufficient for Justice Hollins to say there was merely a "relationship" between the defendant Gowlings and the organizations for which she is Director at the time she was assigned; Gowlings legally represents the organizations of which Justice Hollins was identified as Director at the time she began case managing this case.  Justice Hollins' statement that the plaintiff "accepted" the insufficient details about her involvement with the CBA (and nothing about the CBF and LFF), also not on the record, is simply untrue. Justice Hollins/the court's firm letter dated December 5, 2017 stated that Justice Hollins will continue as case management judge and that the subject of conflict of interest would not be entertained further. The plaintiff brought the recusal application because it was no longer tenable for her to remain silent and be denied her right to remedy the conflicts as Justice Hollins' continuation as case management judge would only further unfairly damage the plaintiff's case. Justice Hollins' version also watered down the other conflicts of interest. The conflicts of interest will be reviewed in greater detail in the next blog post.

• Justice Hollins' misstatement of the facts relating to the numerous events concerning her failure to ensure procedural fairness to the plaintiff is stunning. This includes that Justice Hollins failed to state that she only allowed the plaintiff four business days to reply to the defendants' egregiously misstated bill of costs. Justice Hollins falsely stated that the plaintiff agreed to the timeline; the transcript of the March 27, 2019 case management meeting will show that the plaintiff repeatedly stated her concerns with not having seen the defendants' bill of costs yet and that she was not sure if she would have enough time to deal with it and that she may also need to cross-examine on the bill of costs. In another distortion of the facts, Justice Hollins failed to state that the plaintiff stated her concerns with Justice Hollins' refusal to accommodate her schedule for applications and that as a self-represented person she could not deal with five applications in one month's time, and that despite this Justice Hollins sent a letter stating that she "insists" the plaintiff deal with five applications in one month's time and she would proceed with them regardless of whether the plaintiff could be ready. The plaintiff then sent a further letter to her and this time also to the Chief Justice. Only with the Chief Justice's eyes on the letter did Justice Hollins change the schedule with the applications. Evidence for these events is in the plaintiff's April 16, 2019 affidavit.

• The defendants Megan McMahon, Taryn Burnett and Gowlings' bill of costs, submitted by their defence counsel Perry Mack, egregiously misstated the bill of costs, including seeking costs for application dates for which no applications proceeded, and other issues, and then doubling them. This is sharp lawyer practice. Justice Hollins of course failed to listen to the plaintiff, who was already greatly disadvantaged by Justice Hollins restricting her to four business days to prepare for the hearing so that she could not order transcripts. The egregiously misstated costs will be itemized and reviewed in the next blog post. 

• Justice Hollins falsely stated the defendants' prior application she adjudicated was for summary judgment. It was an application for striking, not summary judgment, which involve very different legal tests, analysis (of which Justice Hollins did none) and costs implications. A striking application is based on the pleadings whereas a summary judgment application is more in-depth.  Update May 9, 2019: The decision was updated by corrigendum to remove Justice Hollins' false statement that the defendants' application had been for summary judgment. This correction was made after the plaintiff sent a letter of complaint about it to the Chief Justice.

Justice Hollins' "errors" in this case are likely among the most serious the public will have seen, and certainly when it comes to one party being self-represented. It is shocking that Justice Hollins seems to believe that no one will notice her "errors" and that she can not be held accountable. 

Fortunately, the serious shortcomings in her rulings are obvious when jurisprudence is applied and in comparison with the facts and evidence. As with the plaintiff's appeal in progress of Justice Hollins' decision on amendments and striking, the plaintiff's appeal materials for these latest "errors" will also be distributed to all public offices in Canada relevant to these issues. 

The plaintiff has filed an application for the recusal of Justice Michele H. Hollins, seeking that she be recused from hearing further applications in this case.

The recusal application is necessary to prevent further prejudice to the plaintiff, given serious conflicts of interest involving Justice Hollins and her failure to disclose them on the record and refusal to allow for inquiry of them, in addition to Justice Hollins' denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on March 13 to deal with the serious errors in Justice Hollins' prior decision for the amendments and striking applications. Click here to read the Notice of Appeal.

Justice Hollins limited the plaintiff's brief to five pages, while not restricting the defendants' brief to any page length.

Below is the brief of the plaintiff for recusal, with some reference to the defendants' application for enhanced costs which Justice Hollins gave the plaintiff an unreasonable four business days to respond to. The next blog post will contain the plaintiff's full oral argument with important facts and binding case law Justice Hollins blatantly disregarded.

First, immediately below is a very brief summary of the two main issues raised by the plaintiff for the application for the recusal of Justice Hollins: Conflicts of Interest and Procedural Fairness.

1. Justice Hollins is in serious conflicts of interest as case management judge in this case.

Conflict of Interest #1:

• The defendant Gowlings represents organizations of which Justice Hollins is identified as Director. By letter dated December 1, 2017 defence counsel Perry Mack advised that Justice Hollins was currently identified as a Director of the Canadian Bar Foundation (CBF) and the Canadian Bar Law for the Future Fund (LFF), at the same time of Justice Hollins' assignment to this case in November 2017, and that the defendant Gowlings represents these organizations. 
• Justice Hollins failed to disclose this conflict of interest on the record and, through a firm letter through the Court dated December 5, 2017, refused to allow the plaintiff to inquire as to the conflict of interest. This is also despite the recent Court of Appeal decision in this same case, Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 ABCA 384, which requires judges to disclose potential conflicts of interest on the record.
• Insufficient information was given by Justice Hollins/the Court as to her involvement as Director with the CBA, and no details were given at all as to Justice Hollins' involvement with the CBF and LFF, the two organizations that were raised as being Gowlings' clients in Mr. Mack's December 1, 2017 letter. Current online Government of Canada Corporation records as at April 2019 (relevant time period November 2017 records no longer accessible online) show that all three of the organizations are separate legal entities and have different Board of Directors and, therefore, any of the details provided as far as Justice Hollins' involvement with the CBA, which were already insufficient, did not even attempt to address the conflicts of interest regarding Justice Hollins being Director of the CBF and LFF at the same time she was assigned as case management judge to this case.

Conflict of Interest #2:

• Justice Hollins is Council Member of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) (partner to the CBF and LFF). Council Members of the CBA have significant operational and strategic oversight of the CBA.
• Justice Hollins did not disclose this conflict of interest and the plaintiff came across this information herself.

Conflict of Interest #3

• Justice Hollins has been, and continues to be, inextricably linked to the CBA, which has website materials in the public domain describing its mandate as "The essential ally and advocate of the legal profession in Alberta". There is significant information in the public domain of this and Justice Hollins' activities to this end. A connection between a judge and the CBA alone is not a conflict of interest, but it is indeed serious when the nature of the case is such that the defendants are lawyers and a law firm and, further, the defendant law firm legally represents the CBA. The two conflicting mandates of ongoing advocacy for lawyers while case managing a case against lawyers are not compatible.

The plaintiff filed extensive evidence with materials for all of the above conflicts of interest, appended to her affidavit dated April 16, 2019.

A reasonable person would find that Justice Hollins is in serious conflicts of interest which raise apprehension of bias. The prejudicial effect of the conflicts of interest to date have already been detrimental as demonstrated in the previous unfair decision from Justice Hollins, which is under appeal.The plaintiff raised the recusal application at this time because it was no longer tenable for her to remain silent and be denied her right to have the conflicts of interest resolved, in order to prevent even further unfair damage to her case.

2. Justice Hollins denied the plaintiff procedural fairness.

This denial of procedure fairness includes several incidents including these:

• Justice Hollins denied the self-represented plaintiff reasonable time and would only allow her four business days to reply to the defendants' bill of costs, which was grossly misstated and even sought an outrageous lump sum for enhanced costs that is double the bill of costs. This is also despite that the defendants already defrauded her and the court by procuring a $150,000 costs judgment with a fraudulently misrepresented bill of costs in the underlying medical malpractice matter, which has not been dealt with to date. The plaintiff needed more than four business days to obtain legal advice from a lawyer, obtain court records, and perform legal research to respond to the outrageous bill of costs and application for enhanced costs.
• Despite that the plaintiff raised concerns with ability to deal with five applications in one month's time, Justice Hollins then wrote a letter stating she "insists" that the plaintiff deal with five applications in one month's time and that she would proceed with them as such even if the plaintiff was not prepared. Following this, the plaintiff sent a further letter which was copied to the Chief Justice and only then did Justice Hollins back away from her insistence of the plaintiff dealing with five applications in one month's time.
• Justice Hollins limited the plaintiff to five pages for her brief, while not stating any page length restriction for the defendants' materials.
• Justice Hollins refused to accommodate the plaintiff on scheduling and other matters despite previously accommodating the defendants for the same requests.
• Evidence of these examples of procedural unfairness, and more, are in the plaintiff's affidavits dated April 16, 2019 and April 25, 2019.

A reasonable person would perceive that this procedural unfairness raises further apprehension of bias. 

Below is the brief of the plaintiff (restricted to five pages by Justice Hollins).

Introduction

1.     This is the brief of the Plaintiff with respect to the application of enhanced costs sought by the Defendants, and procedural issues relating to it. The issues are intertwined with the Plaintiff’s application for the recusal of the Honourable Justice Michele H. Hollins from hearing further applications in this case given serious conflicts of interest.

2.     This case concerns the abusive, dishonest and fraudulent conduct by the Defendants Megan McMahon, Taryn Burnett and their law firm Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP (now known as Gowling WLG LLP, “Gowlings”). The Defendants were the defence legal counsel in the underlying medical malpractice action against their client, Dr. Peter Whidden, who injured the Plaintiff, requiring her to undergo multiple corrective surgeries. In abuse of process and collateral attacks, the within Defendants McMahon and Burnett vexatiously and repeatedly brought abusive and harassing applications on the same basis, all of which were properly dismissed by the court, in addition to extensive further wrongdoing, including the Defendants McMahon and Burnett’s defrauding of the Plaintiff and perpetration of fraud upon the Court in procuring a costs judgment with a fraudulently misrepresented bill of costs claiming costs for fabricated applications that do not exist, applications for which costs were previously denied to the Defendants, and costs for applications for which the Plaintiff was successful, among other issues not dealt with to date. This case is not about duty of care to the opposing side; it is about opposing lawyer serious wrongdoing for which well-settled jurisprudence provides remedies through the Court. 

3.      Justice Hollins gave decision on the parties’ applications for amendments and striking. The decision contains serious errors in law, disregards the Plaintiff’s pleadings, evidence and jurisprudence, fails to transparently state the true nature of the claims against the Defendants, and bears little resemblance to the actual case, among other significant issues including conflicts of interest and refusal to allow for remedying them. Justice Hollins’ decision is currently under appeal.

The Facts and Issues with the Present Applications

4.     With respect to the Defendants’ application for enhanced costs, the Defendants did not provide a bill of costs, which egregiously misstates costs claimed, until April 15, 2019. Justice Michele Hollins failed to allow the Plaintiff sufficient time to prepare for, and respond to, the application. Justice Hollins restricted the Plaintiff to only four business days to deal with the application, also despite that the Plaintiff previously raised concerns with ability to deal with applications on Justice Hollins’ imposed rushed timeline [Plaintiff Affidavit – April 16, 2019].

5.      The Plaintiff does not waive her right to procedural fairness and does not need to submit to unfair procedures and restrictions by Justice Hollins preventing the Plaintiff from properly responding to the enhanced costs application. The self-represented Plaintiff requires sufficient time to obtain legal advice from a lawyer, obtain records from the court, and conduct legal research. Four business days (April 16, 17, 18 & 23, also considering the Easter holidays during this time) is grossly inadequate for the Plaintiff to properly respond to the application.

6.      Justice Hollins previously denied the Plaintiff procedural fairness and sufficient time to deal with applications. Justice Hollins stated in correspondence dated March 19, 2019 that she “insists” that five applications be heard in one month’s time and that if the Plaintiff was not available Justice Hollins would schedule the applications anyway [Plaintiff Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. This was further unfair to the Plaintiff given that Justice Hollins refused to accommodate her schedule and allow for time to cross-examine the Defendants for an application despite that Justice Hollins scheduled the previous amendments and striking applications and related matters according to defence counsel Mr. Mack’s schedule and also invited him to cross-examine the Plaintiff. The unfair scheduling of five applications in one month’s time was not modified until the Plaintiff wrote a letter dated March 21, 2019 with these concerns to Justice Hollins with copy to the Chief Justice [Plaintiff Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. It is also noteworthy that Justice Hollins restricted the Plaintiff’s brief to five pages while not stating any page length restriction for the Defendants’ materials.

7.      These issues of procedural fairness are intertwined with issues in the Plaintiff’s impending application seeking the recusal of Justice Hollins from hearing further applications in this case, given serious conflicts of interest. Justice Hollins’ failure to allow the Plaintiff sufficient time to deal with the enhanced costs application raises further grounds of apprehension of bias for the Plaintiff’s application seeking recusal. This is exacerbated by the fact that Justice Hollins originally agreed to hear the recusal application before any further applications but then in subsequent correspondence with her office on April 17, 2019 stated she would hear the Defendants’ application for enhanced costs regardless of recusal application outcome [Plaintiff April 24, 2019 Affidavit].

8.      In disregard for the Court of Appeal’s decision in this same case, Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 ABCA 384, which sets out disclosure requirements of judges concerning potential bias, Justice Hollins’ failed to disclose serious conflicts of interest on the record and denied the Plaintiff her right to inquire as to the conflicts of interest. Details of these conflicts of interest which raise apprehension of bias include:

(a)   In correspondence dated December 1, 2017, at the time of the assignment of Justice Hollins as case management judge, defence counsel Mr. Mack advised that the Defendant Gowlings represents the Canadian Bar Foundation and the Canadian Bar Law for the Future Fund, and that Justice Hollins is identified as a Director [Plaintiff’s Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. 

(b)   In reply correspondence dated December 5, 2017, Justice Hollins and the Court provided some details about Justice Hollins’ involvement as Director with the Canadian Bar Association (CBA), which do not sufficiently address the conflict of interest raised, nor were such details provided on the record. The correspondence made no mention of Justice Hollins’ Director position with the Canadian Bar Foundation (CBF) or the Canadian Bar Law for the Future Fund (LFF), the two organizations indicated in Mr. Mack’s December 1, 2017 correspondence. Further, Justice Hollins' December 5, 2017 correspondence stated that the subject would “not be entertained further”, denying the Plaintiff fair opportunity to inquire as to the conflict of interest [Plaintiff’s Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. 

(c)   The CBA, CBF, and LFF are separate legal entities, each with different Board of Directors, Corporation Numbers, and Business Numbers, according to the Government of Canada Federal Corporation Information reports [Plaintiff’s Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. 

(d)   Justice Hollins’ Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment details her extensive and lengthy involvement with the Canadian Bar Association, including Director positions and other positions. 

(e)   A further undisclosed conflict of interest is that Justice Hollins is currently a Council Member of the Canadian Bar Association, with significant operational and strategic responsibilities [Plaintiff’s Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. 

(f)    Another undisclosed conflict of interest is that Justice Hollins has been, and continues to be, inextricably linked to activities, operations and strategies of the CBA, whose agenda is stated in CBA materials to be to champion lawyers, serve as the face and voice of lawyers, and be “The essential ally and advocate of the legal profession in Alberta.” [Plaintiff’s Affidavit – April 16, 2019]. Further, Justice Hollins’ personal social media Twitter account, currently with nearly 300 occurrences of the word “CBA”, is used extensively to promote the CBA agenda and lawyers. Justice Hollins’ conflicting CBA role as “essential ally and advocate of the legal profession in Alberta” and related activities to this end are incompatible with her role in case managing and adjudicating applications in the within case against lawyers McMahon, Burnett and their law firm Gowlings.

9.      Justice Hollins only now permits the Plaintiff to make a recusal application for conflicts of interest, after Justice Hollins rendered an unfair decision disposing of the Plaintiff’s claims without regard to her pleadings, evidence and jurisprudence and after the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal therefrom.

10.  To be clear, the recusal application is not an opportunity for Justice Hollins to attempt to cure her failure to disclose conflicts of interest and her failure to allow inquiry and remediation of them. Jurisprudence is clear that conflicts of interest and apprehension of bias can not be cured by a subsequent decision: Quattro Farms Ltd v County of Forty Mile No. 8, 2019 ABQB 135 citing Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 ABCA 384 and Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), 1992 CanLII 84 (SCC).

11.  The proper remedy to prevent further prejudice to the Plaintiff and erosion of the public’s confidence in the administration of justice is for Justice Hollins to immediately recuse herself from hearing any further applications in this case.

The Law

12.  In the Supreme Court of Canada decision Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, the Supreme Court found that denying a party opportunity to file a reply on costs gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias:

Moreover, the trial judge’s refusal to allow the Yukon to file a reply on costs is highly problematic in the overall context of the trial. After the release of his reasons on the merits, the trial judge required each party to file their costs submissions on the same day. To the Yukon’s surprise, the Board sought not only solicitor-client costs, but also punitive damages and solicitor-client costs retroactive to 2002. The trial judge’s refusal to allow the Yukon to file a reply factum is questionable, particularly in light of the fact that the Yukon could not have known the quantum of costs sought by the Board at the time it filed its factum. The judge’s refusal is made all the more worrisome by his decision to award a lump-sum payment to the Board, in addition to retroactive costs. All of these incidents, taken together and viewed in their context, would lead a reasonable and informed person to see the trial judge’s conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

13.  In Seminatore v. Banks, 2006 NBCA 110 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal stated at paras. 8 & 9 that failing to ensure a procedurally fair hearing, in addition to failing to accommodate a party on procedural matters while giving the same accommodation to the other party, raised the appearance of lack of impartiality:

Fundamental to any concept of procedural fairness must be a judicial duty to do whatever is possible to provide a fair and impartial process and prevent an unfair disadvantage to self-represented persons…In this case, the trial judge failed to discharge that duty when she invited one of the self-represented parties to cross-examine the other party, but did not reciprocate with such an invitation when the party-witness roles were reversed. Thus, there is the appearance of a lack of impartiality. As well, the omission prevented Mr. Seminatore from having “a fair hearing.”  It was for these reasons that we allowed the appeal, set aside the trial judge’s decision and remitted the matter back to the Court of Queen’s Bench to set a date for a trial de novo.

14.  In Wagg v. Canada, 2003 FCA 303, the Federal Court of Appeal stated the importance of balancing resolving matters expeditiously and adjudicating in a fair and principled manner. At para. 61:

…Trial judges have a responsibility, particularly when dealing with unrepresented litigants, to strike a balance between the desire to resolve matters expeditiously, and the need to adjudicate cases in a principled manner that employs a fair process and preserves the appearance of justice.

15.  The test for apprehension of bias and the importance of impartiality in our justice system is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45 (CanLIl), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259 at paras 57& 60:

...Simply put, public confidence in our legal system is rooted in the fundamental belief that those who adjudicate in law must always do so without bias or prejudice and must be perceived to do so…In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically - and having thought the matter through - conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly."

16.  With respect to disclosure requirements by judges, the Alberta Court of Appeal stated in Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 384 at para. 30:

A judge must disclose on the record to the parties information that might cause the objective observer to conclude that the judge may not be impartial. Disclosure must provide the parties with sufficient information to allow them to determine whether to ask the judge to recuse him or herself and, if necessary, an appeal court reviewing the original judge’s decision on the recusal application to discharge its appellate function…

17.  Also in Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 384, with respect to disclosure of relationships with organizations, the Court stated at para. 102:

Suppose that a judge hearing a constitutional challenge to provincial legislation that deprives persons who are charged with an alcohol-related driving crime of their driver’s licences for a stipulated period of time is a member of the board of directors of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. MADD’s mission “is to stop impaired driving” and it promotes a legislative agenda to achieve that end. Neither case law nor statements made by the Canadian Judicial Council or its Commonwealth counterparts provide any support for the view that the judge need not disclose this relationship. These sources clearly lead to the conclusion that disclosure is necessary. The Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Yukon Francophone School Board v. Yukon Territory[60] provides ample support for the conclusion that the judge’s relationship with MADD may cause an objective observer to question the impartiality of the trial judge and must be disclosed. So does the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles for Judges:[61] “Judges should avoid involvement in causes or organizations that are likely to be engaged in litigation”. This determination triggers the judge’s obligation to disclose his role as a MADD director and the goals and strategies of MADD.

18.  In Nazarewycz v. Dool, 2009 ABCA 70 the Alberta Court of Appeal set aside the order of a chambers judge and ordered his removal due to reasonable apprehension of bias determined by his words and actions. The Court stated at paras. 76 and 77:

These remarks and directions, without notice or opportunity for argument, gave rise to an appearance that he was predisposed against the appellant and his counsel, and had prejudged certain issues.

It seems evident that the chambers judge had made up his mind and had determined to move forward with his judgment, including dealing with the matters that had never been raised and with respect to which counsel had no opportunity to make submissions.

19.  In Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), 1992 CanLII 84 (SCC), the Supreme Court of Canada stated that fairness to the parties includes procedural fairness and, further, that reasonable apprehension of bias can not be cured by a subsequent decision:

The duty to act fairly includes the duty to provide procedural fairness to the parties…As I have stated, it is impossible to have a fair hearing or to have procedural fairness if a reasonable apprehension of bias has been established. If there has been a denial of a right to a fair hearing it cannot be cured by the tribunal's subsequent decision. A decision of a tribunal which denied the parties a fair hearing cannot be simply voidable and rendered valid as a result of the subsequent decision of the tribunal. Procedural fairness is an essential aspect of any hearing before a tribunal. The damage created by apprehension of bias cannot be remedied. The hearing, and any subsequent order resulting from it, is void.

20.  The Canadian Judicial Council’s Commentaries on Judicial Conduct states:

Long-standing tradition in Canada and in Great Britain is that a judge speaks but once on a given case and that is in the Reasons for Judgment. Thereafter, the judge is not free to explain, or defend, or comment upon the judgment or even to clarify that which critics have perceived to be ambiguous.

21.  It would not be prudent for a judge to adjudicate further applications when a finding of apprehension of bias by the Court of Appeal, or success on a recusal application, is imminent given that all decisions of the judge will be void and without effect. Carbone v. McMahon, 2017 ABCA 384 cites Supreme Court case law to this effect: “when a court of appeal determines that the trial judge was biased or demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, that finding retroactively renders all the decisions and orders made during the trial void and without effect”: The Queen v. Curragh Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 537, 544. See also United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 126 (D.Mass. 2015) (“Nor can a new [trial] schedule be established until the motion for my recusal is finally resolved”).

22.  Justice Hollins has denied the Plaintiff procedural fairness in preparing, and replying to, the Defendants’ application for enhanced costs. The Plaintiff must be given reasonable time to prepare for the application. This procedural unfairness and the further procedural unfairness described above give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias.

23.  A reasonable person would conclude that Justice Hollins is in conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interest are current or occur in the recent past without sufficient passage of time. A reasonably informed bystander could reasonably perceive bias on the part of Justice Hollins. Justice Hollins’ failure to allow for inquiry of the conflicts of interest raises further apprehension of bias.

24.  The continuation of Justice Hollins as case management judge would put the administration of justice into further disrepute.